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Handling Re-Presented Checks-
Risky Business for Collecting and
Payor Banks
By DAVID J. LEIBSON*
INTRODUCTION
In our daily lives we take checks from friends, businesses and
even strangers, and deposit them into our own accounts for col-
lection. These checks are usually paid by the bank upon which they
are drawn. Occasionally one is dishonored by the payor bank and
ultimately returned to our bank which, in turn, sends it back to
us. Often when a check is returned, especially if it was dishonored
due to insufficient or uncollected funds, our response is to re-
present it through the collection process in the hope that the un-
collected funds have been collected or the drawer has deposited ad-
ditional money so that it will be paid upon re-presentment. Some-
times an intermediary collecting bank' or our own depositary bank2
re-presents the dishonored item without first returning it to us.3
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law; B.A. Vanderbilt, 1966;
J.D. University of Louisville, 1969; LL.M. Harvard, 1970. The author expresses his ap-
preciation to his student assistant, Gerald Bums, who aided in the research for this Article.
I Uniform Commercial Code § 4-105(c) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] defines an in-
termediary collecting bank as "any bank to which an item is transferred in course of col-
lection except the depositary or payor bank." All cites to the U.C.C. will be from the 1978
Official Text.
2 The "depositary bank," is "the first bank to which an item is transferred for col-
lection even though it is also the payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105(a).
A recent non-scientific survey of several banking institutions in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, revealed a lack of uniformity in the way banks handle dishonored checks. Some
automatically re-present checks of fifty dollars or less. Others re-present checks only if they
are drawn on themselves. Still others routinely re-present checks of five hundred dollars
or less.
It is clear that some banks feel that automatic re-presentment is economically feasi-
ble and promotes good customer relations. One bank executive said:
We conducted a survey of re-cleared items of $200 or less, and we discovered
that approximately 75% of such items are paid upon being presented a sec-
ond time. It is also commonly recognized, at least within the bank's book-
keeping department, that customers to whom deposited items are returned
unpaid frequently re-deposit the items in hope that they will clear the second
time through. Therefore, by re-presenting a check, the bank, in addition to
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Absent an agreement with the depositing party,4 must re-presented
items be treated in the same way as those presented for the first
time, or may collecting and payor banks' handle them differently,
taking longer periods of time to ultimately dishonor, return and
send notice of dishonor?
Four sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) are
relevant to this question. Section 4-301 prescribes the time limits
within which a payor bank must act when a check is presented for
payment through the bank collection process. 6 Section 4-302 states
the repercussions which follow if the payor bank does not act
within the proper time.7 Section 4-202 defines the obligations of
saving itself considerable expense, is expediting a re-presenting which the
depositing customer would likely institute anyway. •
' The bank executive quoted in note 3 supra also stated: "We have standing orders
from a number of commercial customers to re-clear either all deposited items or those under
a certain amount."
I " 'Payor bank' means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted."
U.C.C. § 4-105(b).
I U.C.C. § 4-301(1) states:
Where an authorized settlement for a demand item (other than a documen-
tary draft) received by a payor bank otherwise than for immediate payment
over the counter has been made before midnight of the banking day of receipt
the payor bank may revoke the settlement and recover any payment if before
it has made final payment (subsection (1) of Section 4-213) and before its mid-
night deadline it
(a) returns the items; or
(b) sends written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if the item is held
for protest or is otherwise unavailable for return.
'Midnight' deadline with respect to a bank is midnight on its next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which
the time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later." U.C.C. § 4-104(h).
U.C.C. § 4-302 states:
In the absence of a valid defense such as breach of a presentment warranty
(subsection (1) of Section 4-207), settlement effected or the like, if an item
is presented on and received by a payor bank the bank is accountable for the
amount of
(a) a demand item other than a documentary draft whether properly
payable or not if the bank, in any case where it is not also the depositary
bank, retains the item beyond midnight of the banking day of receipt without
settling for it or, regardless of whether it is also the depositary bank, does
not pay or return the item or send notice of dishonor until after its midnight
deadline; or
(b) any other properly payable item unless within the time allowed for
acceptance or payment of that item the bank either accepts or pays the item
or returns it and accompanying documents.
The Official Comment to § 4-302 states:
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a bank when handling an item for colection.8 Section 4-103 ad-
dresses the effect of agreements between parties and the impact of
such agreements on the provisions of Article Four.9 In addition
to these sections, section 4-108(1) has relevance to the issues and
its impact will also be considered.'"
Even though all of these sections, and a few others, have been
applied by courts confronted with lawsuits involving re-presented
items, not one of them specifically mentions re-presentment." This
Purposes. Under Section 4-301, time limits are prescribed within which
a payor bank must take action if it receives an item payable by it. Section
4-302 states the rights of the customer if the payor bank fails to take the ac-
tion required within the limits prescribed.
I U.C.C. §§ 4-202(1)-(2) state:
(1) A collecting bank must use ordinary care in
(a) presenting an item or sending it for presentment; and
(b) sending notice of dishonor or non-payment or returning an item other
than a documentary draft to the bank's transferor after learning that the item
has not been paid or accepted, as the case may be; and
(c) settling for an item when the bank receives final settlement; and
(d) making or providing for any necessary protest; and
(e) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit within a
reasonable time after discovery thereof.
(2) A collecting bank taking proper action before its midnight deadline follow-
ing receipt of an item, notice or payment acts seasonably; taking proper ac-
tion within a reasonably longer time may be seasonable but the bank has the
burden of so establishing.
I U.C.C. § 4-103(1) states:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement ex-
cept that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack
of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure
of damages for such lack or failure; but the parties may by agreement deter-
mine the standards by which such responsibility is to be measured if such stan-
dards are not manifestly unreasonable.
3, U.C.C. § 4-108(1) states:
Unless otherwise instructed, a collecting bank in a good faith effort to
secure payment may, in the case of specific items and with or without the
approval of any person involved, waive, modify or extend time limits imposed
or permitted by this Act for a period not in excess of an additional banking
day without discharge of secondary parties and without liability to its
transferor or any prior party.
See text accompanying notes 16-35 infra for a discussion of the impact of U.C.C. § 4-108(1)
on the re-presentment process.
1 The absence of express provisions to cover this problem is lamented by Professors
Leary & Schmitt in Some Bad News and Some Good News from Articles Three and Four,
43 Omo ST. L.J. 611, 624-32 (1982). Their sympathies clearly lie with the banks, and they
give their reasons for treating a re-presented item differently.
There is on the horizon the Uniform New Payments Code (Proposed Draft June 2,
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Article will explore re-presentment and delineate the pitfalls that
face banks when handling previously dishonored checks.
I. LIABILITY OF THE COLLECTING BANK
A collecting bank is any bank, including a non-payor
depositary bank, "handling the item for collection except the payor
bank."' 2 The collecting bank's obligation when collecting an item
is to use ordinary care in presenting the item or sending it for
presentment, and to notify its transferor if the item is dishonored.'3
The time component of this obligation is fulfilled if the collecting
bank takes proper action within its midnight deadline 14 after receiv-
ing the item or notice, but if it does not act within that time it has
the burden of proving that its otherwise proper action was timely
enough to meet the standard of ordinary care.'" Section 4-108(1)
provides a modest latitude to the midnight deadline restriction. It
states that a collecting bank, if not otherwise instructed, "in a good
faith effort to secure payment may... without the approval of
any person involved, waive, modify or extend time limits imposed
or permitted by this Act for a period not in excess of an additional
banking day.., without liability to its transferor or any prior
party."' 6 One may argue that the effect of section 4-108(1) is to
1983) [hereinafter cited as U.N.P.C.]. This Act is being drafted by a committee of the Per-
manent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. Its purpose is to amend or replace Articles 3 and
4 of the U.C.C. so as to have a single body of law that governs all noncash payment systems,
including electronic funds transfers. In its latest draft, the U.N.P.C. explicitly covers the
liability of a payor bank which handles an order which is "resubmitted for payment after
once being dishonored and returned," and extends the midnight deadline seven business
days. U.N.P.C. § 420(1)(c) (Proposed Draft June 2, 1983); U.N.P.C. § 420 comment 1.
Such a solution will probably make Professors Leary and Schmitt happier than they
are now. This writer, as the reader will see, is not convinced that re-presented checks should
be treated differently. The U.N.P.C. may not be too bad a solution, however, as it offers
only a relatively short extension of the period to avoid liability on the re-presented item
by returning it or by sending written notice of dishonor.
12 U.C.C. § 4-105(d). See note 2 supra for the text of 4-105(a), which defines
"depositary bank." The definition of a depositary bank is encompassed by the definition
of "collecting bank" so long as the depositary bank is not also the payor bank.
" U.C.C. § 4-202(1). See note 8 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 4-202(1).
" See note 6 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 4-104(h), which defines the midnight
deadline.
, See U.C.C. § 4-202(2). For the text of U.C.C. § 4-202(2), see note 8 supra.
6 U.C.C. § 4-108(1). This section only applies to collecting banks and does not give
payor banks any latitude to avoid the time limits of §§ 4-301 and 4-302. Arguably, by not
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make it impossible for a collecting bank to meet its burden of
establishing the exercise of ordinary care when it fails to take proper
action within its midnight deadline or the one banking day extended
period, if applicable. Official Comment Two to section 4-108 states
that "the escape provision should afford a limited degree of flex-
ibility in special cases but should not interfere with the overall re-
quirement and objective of speedy collections." 17 On the other
hand, Official Comment Three to 4-202 notes that section 4-202(2)
is subject to section 4-108 but does not say that it is limited by sec-
tion 4-108.18
Clements v. Central Bank of Georgia'9 considered the impact
of section 4-108(1) on the collecting bank's obligation. Clements
was the payee of a $30,000 check which he endorsed to Continen-
tal Equity Corporation, of which he was a director. 20 The check
was deposited in the corporation's account in Central Bank on
September 25, 1978, and that bank sent the check directly to the
payor bank "for collection." 2' On September 29 the payor orally
informed Central Bank that the check was drawn against un-
collected funds and would probably never be paid.22 The check was
not returned to Central Bank because the bank manager of Cen-
tral Bank told the payor to hold the check in the hope that it later
would be covered. 23 The check was not covered, however, and on
October 31 Central Bank told the payor to return it.24 Central
received the check on November 3 and on that date sent written
notice of dishonor to the endorser, Clements.2" Subsequently Cen-
including payor banks, the drafters indicated an intent that § 4-301 and § 4-302 be strictly
applied. See text accompanying notes 133 to 140 infra for a discussion of the impact of
§ 4-108(1) on the payor bank's liability.
" U.C.C. § 4-108 comment 2.
" See U.C.C. § 4-202 comment 3.
, 270 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
20 Id. at 196.
2, Id. The check was sent to the payor bank directly because on the same day this
check was deposited, the collecting bank received notice from the Federal Reserve System
that another unrelated check by the same drawer was being returned for lack of funds.
Id. A note was attached to the $30,000 check when it was mailed which instructed the payor
bank: "Check for collection-Return if not paid in three days." Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 197.
2S Id.
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tral filed suit against Clements on his endorser's contract26 and
Clements defended by asserting that the notice of dishonor was not
timely, since it was given long after midnight on the day after
September 29, the date on which the collecting bank knew that the
check would not be paid, and thus, he was discharged from
liability.2 7 The bank argued that it had exercised ordinary care in
collecting the item and cited section 4-202(2) as justifying its deci-
sion to allow the payor to retain the check and its failure to give
Clements any notice until the check was finally returned.2" The
Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, and stated that section 4-202:
must still comport with what is required by law, and if it does
not then the action is not seasonable.... Any other interpreta-
tion would render most of Article 3, dealing with the cir-
cumstances under which liability or discharge of an indorser is
determined, utterly meaningless.
Moreover, within Article 4 itself the provisions of [section
4-108] control the availability of [section 4-202] in these
circumstances.
29
The court also cited section 4-108(1), emphasizing the language of
that section which gives leeway of only one additional banking day
to try to secure payment.3 0 The court held that, if Clements was
entitled to notice,3" the time for notice started running on
September 29.32
26 Id. See U.C.C. § 3-414(1) for an explanation of the endorser's contract.
27 270 S.E.2d at 197. This defense is predicated upon U.C.C. § 3-502 (1978), which
discharges an endorser from liability on the instrument when notice of dishonor is delayed
beyond the time when it is due. See Samples v. Trust Co. of Ga., 163 S.E.2d 325 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1968).
28 270 S.E.2d at 198-99.
29 Id. at 199.
30 Id.
" The case was remanded for a determination of whether on the facts notice was
excused. Id. at 200.
31 Id. at 198. Whether the check was actually dishonored is questionable. U.C.C. §
3-507(l)(a) provides that in the case of a bank collection a check is not dishonored until
returned by the payor's midnight deadline. This check was never returned. Thus, final pay-
ment may have occurred under U.C.C. §§ 4-213(1)(d) and 4-301(l) since the payor never
revoked settlement and returned the check. The court did not discuss these sections but
rather relied upon U.C.C. § 3-506(2) which requires a payor bank to make payment before
midnight of the day of receipt. In the absence of such payment dishonor occurs. However,
§ 3-506(2) applies only when a check is presented for immediate payment over the counter.
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Although Clements did not involve a re-presentment of a
dishonored check, the situation is analogous since the collecting
bank unilaterally decided not to notify its customer of the payor
bank's action and allowed the payor an extended time to pay. The
court, by relying on sections 4-202 and 4-108(1), served notice on
collecting banks that they should notify their customers of the situa-
tion if they are to avoid liability on a dishonored check because
of their negligence,33 or successfully recover from the customer on
his endorser's contract,34 or utilize the section 4-212 right to charge
back."
The Clements rationale is consistent with that of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in United Kentucky Bank v. Eagle Machine Co.36
The facts of this case represent a classic example of what can hap-
pen when a collecting bank does not notify the customer that a
check has been dishonored. Tan-Dem Machinery purchased equip-
ment from Eagle Machine Co. for $85,000 and issued a check for
$30,000 as a down payment.37 Eagle deposited the check in its ac-
count with United Kentucky on March 17, 1980.38 United sent the
check to Continental Illinois Bank and Trust which presented it
for payment to the payor bank, First Security Trust of Utah.39 First
Security dishonored the check and notified Continental of the
dishonor on March 20.0 For some reason Continental did not
notify United Kentucky of the dishonor until April 2 and did not
return the check to United Kentucky until April 8. Upon receiv-
This was not the case here even though the check was presented directly through the mail
in the hope collection would be expedited. Thus, U.C.C. § 4-301 and its deferred posting
provisions, not U.C.C. § 3-506(2), was applicable.
Clements did not assert payment by the payor bank, and therefore, no dishonor. Prob-
ably the court would not have accepted such an argument because of the collecting bank's.
direction to the payor bank to retain the item. Thus, it probably was best for Clements
to direct the court's attention to the collecting bank's failure to give notice when it knew
there were insufficient funds.
11 See 270 S.E.2d at 199.
14 See U.C.C. § 3-414.
15 See U.C.C. § 4-212.
3 644 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
37 Id.
36 Id.
39 Id.
41 Id. Presumably the check was returned at the same time, although this is not clear.
First Security's liability, if any, under U.C.C. §§ 4-301 and 4-302, was not an issue.
1983-84]
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ing the check, United Kentucky did not return the check or send
any notice of dishonor to its customer. Instead, pursuant to its own
regulations, it mailed the check back to Continental.," Continen-
tal ultimately returned the check to United Kentucky on May 7,
and on May 20, sixty-one days after the dishonor and forty-eight
days after United Kentucky had notice of the dishonor, United
Kentucky notified Eagle of the dishonor., 2
Eagle alleged that between April 4 and April 30, believing that
Tan-Dem's $30,000 check had cleared, it delivered three truck loads
of machinery to Tan-Dem. It stated that had United Kentucky
notified it of the dishonor, the machinery would never have been
delivered, and thus, due to the bank's failure to exercise ordinary
care as required by section 4-202, Eagle suffered loss and was en-
titled to recover from the bank the amount of the check. 41 The
bank asserted that it exercised ordinary care by following its own
regulation to which Eagle had agreed by opening a deposit
account." The court rejected this argument,45 stating:
What is urged may be true, but what appellant overlooks is the
contention that in spite of its privilege of resubmission of the
check it was, nevertheless, negligent in failing to notify its
depositor of the dishonor as soon as it gained that knowledge.
... Eagle made a substantial change of position based upon a
misconception occasioned by United's negligence in failing to
promptly give notice of the situation."6
The court's reasoning is persuasive. U.C.C. section 4-202 makes
presentment and sending notice of a dishonor two separate
obligations.47 Therefore, it is proper to distinguish between a bank's
"1 644 S.W.2d at 649. Continental evidently did not re-present to First Security, but
held the check waiting for United Kentucky to present it a statement of loss.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 650. U.C.C. § 4-103(5) states the appropriate measure of damages. Eagle
was either very lucky or very capably represented. United Kentucky received notice of
dishonor on April 2 and Eagle did not begin delivering the equipment until April 4, the
day after United Kentucky's midnight deadline! Had it delivered the goods earlier its loss
probably would not have been caused by United Kentucky and Eagle would have been forced
to look to one of the out of state banks, probably Continental Illinois, for redress.
" 644 S.W.2d at 650.
" Id.
46 Id.
41 See note 8 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 4-202.
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right to re-submit a dishonored check and its obligation to notify
its customer that a dishonor has occurred. It should not
automatically follow that a right to re-present carries with it a right
not to notify the customer of the dishonor. "s Bankers may respond
that re-presentment is a service to the customer, 9 and if the bank
has to give notice of dishonor even if it re-presents, then it might
as well send the dishonored check back to the customer along with
the notice, thereby placing the burden of re-starting the collection
process upon the customer. A bank certainly has a right to do just
that, even though it may be costly. Economic infeasibility, however,
is no reason to insulate a bank from any loss caused by its failure
to give notice. In the absence of a contrary agreement which is
clearly understood by the customer, he has a right to expect his
bank to provide negative information about deposited checks. It
is a normal reaction, if nothing is heard within a week or ten days
after deposit, to surmise that a check has been paid 50 and to act
accordingly."1 The collecting bank that does not notify the customer
" This is especially true where the customer does not expressly agree to waive notice
of dishonor. In addition, U.C.C. § 4-103, while allowing the effect of the provisions of
Article Four to be varied, specifically precludes an agreement which disclaims "a bank's
responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care."
See also Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Akpan, 398 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Civ. Ct. 1977)
(refused to validate a clause in the deposit contract waiving notice of protest, since to do
so would endorse plaintiff's failure to exercise ordinary care).
"' See notes 3-4 supra.
o This may not be true in the case of a documentary or other draft drawn upon a
collecting bank's.customer. U.C.C. § 4-501, which states the duty of a bank handling a
documentary draft for its customer, is consistent with U.C.C. § 4-202 in requiring
"seasonable" notification of nonpayment or nonacceptance. Of course, what is "seasonable"
is a question of fact. See U.C.C. § 4-202 comment 3. See also note 52 infra for the text
of U.C.C. § 4-104(f), which defines a "documentary draft."
A number of U.C.C. § 4-202 cases have considered whether it is negligent for the
collecting bank to fail, within the midnight deadline, to inform prior parties that a non-
bank draft has been dishonored. Often it does not, due to an established course of dealing
or a custom that such drafts are held until paid or until the collecting bank can no longer
reasonably expect payment to be made. See, e.g., Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank, 670 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1982); Phelan v. University Nat'l Bank, 229 N.E.2d
374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Whitehall Packing Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 390 N.Y.S.2d
189 (App. Div. 1976). Cf. Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 155 (N.D.
Iowa 1977) (collecting bank failed to carry its burden of proving the course of dealing or
custom), petition for cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
11 I recently asked my students (sixty-six in all) in two U.C.C. classes whether they
felt the same is true when a previously dishonored check is re-presented. Fifty answered
"yes" and stated that, absent explicit agreement by the customer to the contrary, the same
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of a dishonor should be liable for any damages caused, and the
reasoning of United Kentucky Bank v. Eagle Machine Co. should
be followed.
II. LAzIrrY OF THE PAYOR BANK
U.C.C. sections 4-301 and 4-302 obligate the payor bank to
act within its midnight deadline in determining whether to pay or
dishonor a demand item other than a documentary draft
2
presented for payment through the bank collection process." The
payor bank is the crucial bank in the collection process, thus the
time for acting is short.
Depositary and collecting banks act primarily as conduits. The
steps that they take can only indirectly affect the determination
of whether or not a check is to be paid, which is the focal point
in the check collection process .... The role of a payor bank
in the collection process, on the other hand, is crucial. It knows
whether or not the drawer has funds available to pay the item. 4
A check is the most common demand item. It is payable on presen-
tation to the payor bank unless a time for payment is specified on
the instrument. 5 Whether a re-presented check changes its stripes
and is no longer a demand item, or for some other reason is not
U.C.C. obligations and time limitations should be applied to collecting and payor banks
when handling a re-presented check as when handling one for the first time.
I did not reveal my position during the discussion. While it may be argued that law
students with some sophistication in the U.C.C. are not "normal" samples, it seems that,
if anything, they might be expected to be more sympathetic to the banks since they have
studied the bank collection process and might feel that a party who re-presents a check
knowing it has already been dishonored is aware of the risk and does not have a right to
expect the original rules to apply. Indeed, some students took this position. However, twenty-
six of thirty-two who had completed the course in Negotiable Instruments felt the same
rules should apply to the re-presented check.
52 U.C.C. § 4-104(f) (1978) defines "documentary draft" as "any negotiable or non-
negotiable draft with accompanying documents, securities or other papers to be delivered
against honor of the draft."
" See notes 6-7 supra for the text of U.C.C. §§ 4-301 and 4-302.
5' Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co., 204 N.E.2d 721, 723 (I.
1965). See D. L~msoN & R. NowKA, Tm UNwoai ComomcAL CODE oF KmETucKY 325-28,
447 (1983).
11 See U.C.C. § 3-108 (1978), which defines instruments payable on demand as in-
cluding "those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which no time for pay-
ment is stated."
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governed by the midnight deadline rule, has been the issue in a
number of cases. Two distinct lines have emerged. One, initiated
by the Kansas Supreme Court in Leaderbrand v. Central State
Bank,6 does not apply the strict time limit to the re-presented
check. The other, exemplified by cases such as Sun River Cattle
Co. v. Miners Bank" and Blake v. Woodford Bank and Trust
Co.," rejects the reasoning of Leaderbrand, refuses to distinguish
re-presented checks and holds payor banks liable if they do not
act within the prescribed time limit.
Leaderbrand involved a check which had been dishonored twice
due to insufficient funds when presented by the payee for payment
over the counter.5 9 After the second dishonor the plaintiff deposited
the check in his account and his bank mailed it directly to the
defendant payor bank "for collection.""0 The check was received
by the payor bank on March 21 or 22. Sufficient funds were not
deposited by the drawer to cover the check. In addition the drawer
stopped payment on the check and returned to the payee the mer-
chandise purchased with the check.6' The payor bank did not return
the check to the plaintiff's bank until April 5, long after the mid-
night deadline. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the payor bank, pur-
suant to U.C.C. section 4-302(a), was accountable for the amount
of the check. 62
The Kansas Supreme Court held for the payor bank for two
reasons, one statutory and one equitable. It applied U.C.C. sec-
tion 3-511(4) which states: "[W]here a draft has been dishonored
by nonacceptance a later presentment for payment and any notice
of dishonor . . .are excused .... -61 The court realized the
weakness of its reliance on this section since the bank had
dishonored the check by nonpayment, not nonacceptance. 64 The
court admitted that section 3-511(4) speaks of nonacceptance but
450 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1969).
521 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1974).
555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
" 450 P.2d at 3. U.C.C. §§ 4-301 and 4-302 are not applicable to presentations made
for payment over the counter. Instead, U.C.C. § 3-506(2) applies.
10 450 P.2d at 3.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id.
63 U.C.C. § 3-511(4) (1978).
11 See 450 P.2d at 8.
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stated: "[W]e think reference to the dishonor of a 'draft' 'by
nonacceptance' would, a fortiori, include the dishonor of a check
by nonpayment."' 5 This statement was buttressed by a citation to
section 4-301(3)66 which states that "[u]nless previous notice of
dishonor has been sent an item is dishonored at the time when for
purposes of dishonor it is returned or notice sent in accordance
with this section." From this the court concluded that a party is
entitled to only one notice of dishonor on a given check, and since
the plaintiff personally had presented twice and twice the check
had been dishonored, he was not entitled to a third notice."'
Even though the court went to great lengths to hold for the
payor bank under the statute, it also held that the plaintiff was
estopped from asserting section 4-302.68 The court stated:
It is readily apparent the payor bank in the instant case did
not align itself with its customer to protect that customer's credit
and consciously disregard the duty imposed upon it by the
statutory scheme. On the contrary, the payor bank twice
dishonored the item in question when it was presented for pay-
ment. Notice of dishonor was timely imparted to the appellant
in each case because he personally presented the check for pay-
ment at the payor bank without negotiating it. At no time did-
the appellant assume the payor bank had honored the check on
the third presentment and that it would be paid, because he knew
the check had been twice dishonored and was advised by the
Salina bank [the depositary bank], through whom the check was
presented for collection, that he would not be given immediate
credit. 69
63 Id. The court then relied on the "presentment" language of § 3-507(I)(a). However,
that section is applicable only to a necessary or optional presentment for acceptance. Present-
ment of an ordinary check for acceptance is neither necessary nor optional under U.C.C.
§ 3-501(1)(a), and the failure of a bank to accept (certify) an ordinary check does not amount
to dishonor under § 3-507(1)(a).
11 450 P.2d at 9.
1, Id. at 8-9. For a discussion of the propriety of the court's reliance on U.C.C. §
3-511(4) see text accompanying notes 72-82 infra. The problem with the court's reliance
on U.C.C. § 4-301(3) is that the previous presentments were not subject to U.C.C. § 4-301,
and therefore, the dishonors and notices were not made in accordance with that section.
See note 59 supra. Thus, in reaching its decision, the court used two sections which did
not explicitly apply to the facts.
68 450 P.2d at 9.
69 Id. at 8.
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At first glance it may seem Leaderbrand deserved little sym-
pathy. He was not in the same position as one collecting a check
for the first time. Twice before the check had been dishonored,
so he might have expected that it would bounce again. This was
reinforced by his own bank's refusal to grant him immediate credit
when he finally deposited the check, a fact "which inferentially
discloses that the Salina bank had notice of the previous
dishonor." 70 However, all of this knowledge should still not deprive
Leaderbrand of the right to know promptly what happened to the
re-presented check. Is the customer in a re-presentment situation
obligated to call the depositary or payor bank and ask whether the
check was paid, or is he entitled to believe that "no news is good
news" and rely on the bank following the statutory mandate? The
latter seems more appropriate and more in line with the customer's
expectations. In light of the purpose of section 4-302, courts should
apply an equitable defense only in extraordinary situations.7'
Although two cases have favorably cited Leaderbrand's ap-
plication of section 3-511(4) to a check re-presented for payment,
reliance on that section simply cannot be justified. By its language,
section 3-511(4) applies only when there has been nonacceptance. 7 3
Its primary application is to time drafts74 on which the holder un-
successfully attempts to procure acceptance." Such an application
10 Id. The Salina bank may not have had notice of previous dishonor. It is possible
that the policy of the depositary bank was not to allow withdrawal against any uncollected
funds. See Duerr, Check Floating Isn't a Big Draw, Local Banks Say, The Louisville Times,
Sept. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 5.
"' As noted, the drawer stopped payment on this check and returned the merchan-
dise to the plaintiff. 450 P.2d at 3. If the merchandise had been defective or the drawer
had a contractual right to return the merchandise without liability, then a situation ripe
for an equitable remedy would arise. Under such circumstances, Leaderbrand would have
been unjustly enriched if allowed to recover.
" See Whalen & Sons Grain Co. v. Missouri Delta Bank, 496 F. Supp. 211, 214 n.2
(E.D. Mo. 1980); Goodman v. Norman Bank of Commerce, 551 P.2d 661, 662-63 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976).
" U.C.C. § 3-511(4) provides: "Where a draft has been dishonored by nonaccept-
ance a later presentment for payment and any notice of dishonor and protest for nonpay-
ment are excused unless in the meantime the instrument has been accepted." (emphasis
added).
', A "time draft" is an "order to pay a sum certain in money.., at a definite time."
U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b)-(c), (2)(a).
" See Wiley, Tate & Irby v. Peoples Bank & Trust, 438 F.2d 513, 516-17 (5th Cir.
1971) (holding that 3-511(4) is not applicable to demand items), aff'd per curiam, 462 F.2d
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is consistent with sections 3-501(1)(a) and 3-507(1)(a). Section
3-501(1)(a) allows the holder of a time draft the option of present-
ing it for acceptance.7 6 Section 3-507(1)(a) states that if such ac-
ceptance is sought but not obtained from the drawee, a dishonor
occurs.7" A cause of action then accrues against the drawer of the
draft without a further presentment for payment.78
The Leaderbrand analysis of section 3-511(4) has been criticized
not only by courts which have refused to protect payor banks in
re-presentment situations,79 but also by one court which insulated
the payor bank from section 4-30280 liabililty. In David Graubart,
Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York,II the New York Court
of Appeals rejected the Leaderbrand analysis of section 3-511(4)
for the reasons previously discussed.8" However, the court in
179 (1972); B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPosiTs, CoLracnONS AND
CREDrr CARDs 71-72 (1970).
76 U.C.C. § 3-501(l)(a) provides:
(1) Unless excused (Section 3-511) presentment is necessary to change
secondary parties as follows:
(a) presentment for acceptance is necessary to charge the drawer and in-
dorsers of a draft where the draft so provides, or is payable elsewhere than
at the residence or place of business of the drawee, or its date of payment
depends upon such presentment.The holder may at his option present for ac-
ceptance any other draft payable at a stated date.
(emphasis added).
See also U.C.C. § 3-501 comment 3, which states that a "holder may at his option
present any time draft for acceptance." No similar right obtains for a demand draft, which
entitles the holder to immediate payment but not to acceptance.
1 U.C.C. § 3-507(1)(a) provides: "An instrument is dishonored when ... a necessary
or optional presentment is duly made and due acceptance or payment is refused or cannot
be obtained within the prescribed time or in case of bank collections the instrument is
seasonably returned by the midnight deadline (section 4-301)."
" U.C.C. § 3-122(3) provides: "A cause of action against a drawer of a draft..
accrues upon demand following dishonor of the instrument. Notice of dishonor is a de-
mand." This cause of action accrues against the drawer "in conformity with [the drawer's]
underlying contract on the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-122 comment 1.
The drawer's contract is set forth in § 3-413(2): "The drawer engages that upon
dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount
of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up."
79 See text accompanying notes 112-21 infra.
10 See note 7 supra for the text of U.C.C. § 4-302.
" 399 N.E.2d 930 (N.Y. 1979).
82 See text accompanying notes 72-78 supra. The court in Graubart stated:
[W]e conclude.., that [the payor's] reliance on [Leaderbrand] ... is unavail-
ing. The [Leaderbrand] court reasoned that [§ 3-511(4)], in excusing further
notice of dishonor with respect to "drafts" once dishonored by "nonaccept-
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Graubart held for the payor bank because it found that the bank
had held the previously dishonored check beyond the midnight
deadline pursuant to a practice and custom among banks to hold
such a check longer in the hope that sufficient funds will later be
deposited by the drawer.8 3 The court found that the payee agreed
to the practice since its agent, the depositary bank,84 authorized
the payor bank to follow the customary procedure by attaching
an "advice to customer" slip to the re-presented check.85 Accord-
ing to the testimony of Bank Leumi officials, this slip constituted
a memorandum of an agreement "requiring it" to follow the bank-
ing practice of holding the re-presented check "for such time as
is reasonable under all the circumstances, even beyond the mid-
night deadline if necessary, to enable funds from which to pay them
to come into the account." '86 Graubart received a copy of the "ad-
vice to customer" slip and made no objection. 7
The court concluded that the suspension of the midnight
deadline was fair and reasonable in light of the practicalities:
[T]he concept of a midnight deadline is not compatible with any
approach under which the payor bank seeks to wait for the
deposit of funds in the drawer's account. The reasonableness of
such a banking custom must, therefore, be measured on its own
terms. We conclude that this criterion is met when a depositary
bank takes a possibly worthless instrument and directs the payor
bank to adopt a technique that may provide the only chance for
collection....
ance," necessarily encompassed dishonor of "checks" by "nonpayment."
But, while a check is a kind of draft... "nonpayment" and "nonaccept-
ance" are distinctly different concepts, the latter referring specifically to a
payor's refusal to certify that it will honor a time instrument when later
presented for payment .... Since it would be futile to present for payment
a draft that has been dishonored by nonacceptance ... such presentment and
further notice are excused as superfluous. In contrast, a demand item such
as a check may eventually be paid if resubmitted at a time when the drawer's
account has an adequate balance. This possibility makes it entirely reasonable
to afford redeposited checks the full panoply of article 4 protections.
399 N.E.2d at 933 (emphasis in original).
" 399 N.E.2d at 935-36.
" U.C.C. § 4-201(1) makes the depositary bank the customer's agent when the bank
is collecting an item. See U.C.C. § 4-201(1) comment 4.
399 N.E.2d at 933.
Id. at 932.
" Id. at 934.
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There is nothing unfair about this procedure.It is calculated
to produce satisfied obligations in many instances where legal
recourse, with all its attendant expense, inconvenience and uncer-
tainty, would otherwise be necessary. Furthermore, the payee
here cannot claim it was injured by its reliance on the payor
bank's silence after receipt of the item; the prior dishonor pro-
vided adequate warning of the questionable safety of the instru-
ment. In any event, the payee's right to sue the drawer on the
underlying obligation was revived upon the first dishonor, and
representment in no way cut short that prerogative. .... .1
The court's reliance on agency principles is tenuous. In the con-
text of any such custom it is improper to consider the payee's bank
to be solely an agent-depositary bank. In the scheme of the bank
collection process a bank is sometimes a depositary bank,
sometimes an intermediary bank and sometimes the payor bank.
Thus, a bank has every reason to further such a custom, because
on many occasions it will benefit.
The payee can also benefit by allowing the payor to retain a
re-presented check for a longer time, because if payment is even-
tually made the payee does not have to resort to other costly, time
consuming remedies against the drawer. 9 The same thing is true
when a check is presented for the first time. It is also true that the
longer a check is held without payment the slimmer the chances
of ultimate recovery from the drawer. The very fact that the check
was once dishonored and is thus of "questionable safety" is a
factor that mitigates against allowing the payor bank to treat a re-
presented check differently from any other. The payee who re-
presents a check normally does so with the expectation that suffi-
cient funds will be in the drawer's account by the time the check
returns to the payor. He suspects the check was dishonored because
of an honest mistake or tardiness on the part of the drawer. If no
word is received within a normal time, the payee may justifiably
believe that the re-presented check cleared. In the absence of a
bargained for agreement by the payee,9" the payor bank should not
" Id. at 935-36.
" A payee can bring a cause of action against the drawer based on the drawer's con-
tract found in U.C.C. § 3-413(2). In addition, he may sue the drawer on the underlying
obligation for which the check was issued. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(b).
,o A simple failure to react to an "advice to customer" slip should not amount to
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be allowed to hold the re-presented check beyond its midnight
deadline. 9'
The most recent case holding for the payor bank is Idaho
Forest Industries v. Minden Exchange Bank & Trust Co. 92 Like
Graubart, this case involved a re-presentment accompanied by in-
structions from the depositary bank to the payor bank to hold the
checks for ten days if necessary to collect payment. 93 Also, as in
Graubart, the depositary bank mailed the check directly to the
payor bank "for collection," 9 thus bypassing the normal clear-
ing house route.9" The payor bank in Idaho Forest Industries did
not pay or dishonor the checks in question within the ten day
period. Instead it held them for more than two months, finally
returning them when the depositary bank instructed the payor bank
either to pay or return them. 96 Nonetheless, the payor bank was
such an agreement. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) defines "agreement" as the "bargain of the par-
ties" and may include reference to a usage of the trade. The average depositor, however,
upon receiving a copy of an "advice to customer" slip sent by his bank, can hardly be
expected to react in any meaningful way or to negotiate to avoid its use. Most customers
are not likely to challenge bank practices because they are not likely to understand the poten-
tial hazards the bank practices may hold for them. Therefore, unless they agree in an in-
formed way, customers should not be bound by such practices.
There is some reason to believe that the court in Graubart did not consider the payee
to be an uninformed party. Not only did the payee receive the "advice to customer" slip,
it also submitted it into evidence! This fact, according to the court, "confirmed that the
agreement had been made in contemplation of the custom." 399 N.E.2d at 933.
9, The U.N.P.C. does not take this position. See note 11 supra. The drafters of the
U.N.P.C. have noted that its treatment of the re-presented order is in line with the prac-
tice sanctioned by Graubart. See U.N.P.C. § 420 comment 1.
92 326 N.W.2d 176 (Neb. 1982).
Id. at 177.
14 Id. Leary and Schmitt say that bankers often consider items sent directly to the
payor as "collection items" rather than "cash items." See Leary & Schmitt, supra note
1I, at 630-31. "Conceivably a court could look at the sending channel used for second
presentment and find some estoppel as a basis to assert the non-applicability of the 'whether
properly payable or not' penalty of section 4-302(a) when the collection item channel was
used." Id. at 631.
Presumably estoppel would be based on the banking community's traditional treat-
ment of items sent directly to the payor as collection items. But to impose an estoppel upon
a customer who is unsophisticated in banking practices simply because his bank considers
such an item "non-cash" seems harsh and inequitable.
91 Direct presentment is acceptable even when presentment for payment is made for
the first time. See U.C.C. § 4-204(2)(a) ("A collecting bank may send ... any item direct
to the payor bank . . . ."). See also U.C.C. § 4-204 comment 2 (noting that subsection
(2)(a) codifies the widespread practice of direct mail or like presentment to payor banks).
96 326 N.W.2d at 177.
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absolved of liability under section 4-302."'
The court's decision seems based on a finding that the customer
was bound by the instruction of the depositary bank. The court
noted that the instructions to " 'hold for 10 days if necessary' was
a clear indication that the Bank of Idaho [depositary bank] did not
want the checks to be returned unpaid before the midnight
deadline." 9 8 A few days after the ten day period had passed, the
depositary bank asked the payor bank to investigate and report the
situation, but did not demand that the checks be returned. The
depositary's next instruction was given two months later when it
instructed the payor either to pay or return the checks.99 The court
analogized the payee's situation to that of the payee in Western
Air & Refrigeration, Inc. v. Metro Bank.' °0 In Western Air, a check
was dishonored for insufficient funds when the payee presented
it to the payor bank.'0 ' After the dishonor, the treasurer of the
payee corporation had a face to face discussion with officials of
both the payor bank and the drawer.'02 Feeling confident that funds
would be deposited to cover the dishonored check, the treasurer
of the payee corporation left the check with the payor bank to be
paid when funds were received.'03 As part of this transaction, the
payor bank issued a collection receipt to the payee.'0I Under these
facts, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the payee and payor bank
had agreed'05 that the midnight deadline would not apply.' 6
11 Id. at 179.
98 Id.
11 Id. at 177.
100 599 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1979).
101 Id. at 84-85.
102 Id. at 85.
'o' Id. at 85-86.
104 Id. at 86.
"I' The court found that the collection receipt, coupled with the conduct of the payor
and payee after the check was left for collecting, indicated that they agreed the payor "would
hold the check, without regard to its midnight deadline, for a reasonable period of time
to see if funds become available." Id. at 90.
,16 The court also indicated that, under the facts, the payee no longer presented the
item as a "demand item." By leaving the check with the payor bank and taking a receipt
for it, the payee evidenced an intent to allow the bank to hold the check until sufficient
funds were deposited to cover it. Id. at 88.
If a re-presented check is not considered a demand item then § 4-302(a) does not apply.
See note 7 supra for the text of that provision. It has been suggested that the dishonored
item should no longer be considered a "demand item" but rather an "overdue item." See
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The decision in Western Air is correct. The analogy to Western
Air in Idaho Forest Industries is erroneous, however. In Western
Air, the officer of the payee made a conscious decision to leave
the check with the payor and allowed the bank to retain the check
until funds were deposited. 107 The payee should be bound by such
a decision by its authorized agent. In contrast, in Idaho Forest In-
dustries, the depositary bank, an agent of the payee only by opera-
tion of section 4-201, allowed the payor to take the extra time.'10
In addition, there is no indication that the officers of the payee
consciously acquiesced in the payor's retention of the re-presented
checks for more than two months.'"9
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Idaho Forest Industries
characterized Graubart as a case which held for the payor bank
even though it involved "facts much more favorable to the
plaintiff."" 0 However, this characterization is not easily accepted.
In Graubart, the payee received a copy of the "advice to customer"
slip and the payor bank returned the re-presented item within the
ten day period, but in Idaho Forest Industries the delay lasted for
more than two months. This author disagrees with the Graubart
decision, but finds it, on the facts, much more palatable than the
Leary & Schmitt, supra note 11, at 624, 629-32. As such it could be treated as an "other"
item within § 4-302(b). This author contends that a check, even though dishonored, is still
"payable on demand" since no time for payment is stated on it and it is still payable upon
presentment. See U.C.C. § 3-108 (instruments payable on demand include those payable
upon presentment and those in which no time for payment is stated). See also Huntmix,
Inc. v. Bank of America, Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 184 Cal. Rptr. 551, 559 (Ct. App. 1982)
(court rejected argument that re-presented check is not a demand item since it is an over-
due instrument). Homey v. Covington County Bank, 716 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1983),
is consistent in its definition of "demand item," although the case does not involve a re-
presented item.
"1 599 F.2d at 86.
,01 326 N.W.2d at 179.
309 At one point the payor bank notified the depositary bank that the drawer com-
pany was closed. Id. at 177. Presumably it was closed due to financial setbacks. The court
did not consider the impact of this fact and evidently the parties did not emphasize it in
their arguments. Perhaps the fact was omitted because it could potentially favor either party.
Arguably, if the payor bank knew its customer had closed its doors, it should have returned
the checks quickly so that the payee could institute proceedings against the drawer. On the
other hand, assuming the payee knew the drawer was closed, it may have felt its best hope
was to leave the checks with the payor as long as the drawer's account remained open, and
thereby consciously acquiesced in the payor's retention of the check.
330 Id. at 178.
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decision in Idaho Forest Industries."'
Most of the cases which apply the same time limits to re-
presented checks also involve re-presentments by depositary-agent
banks. At least one case, Sun River Cattle Co. v. Miners Bank,I 2
included a direct re-presentment to the payor bank "for collec-
tion." In Sun River, the court rejected the Leaderbrand analysis
of section 3-511(4) and also found insufficient evidence to impose
upon the payee an agreement that the payor bank treat the re-
presented item differently." 3 The payor bank argued that such an
agreement arose from the fact that the payee's bank, in re-
presenting "for collection," "understood that the checks would
be held by Miners [the payor]," '114 since this was the "general
custom and practice within the banking industry for the handling
of checks sent for collection.""' 5
It would be inaccurate to cite Sun River as a case which
analyzes the appropriate U.C.C. sections in depth and considers
the policy implications of the various arguments. Strong equitable
considerations pervade the opinion and it is clear that the court
had no interest in protecting the payor, Miners Bank.'" Miners
was the primary lender to the drawer and was at all times interested
I, The Nebraska court apparently believed that the Graubart facts were more favorable
to the payee since the instruction to the payor bank was to "return immediately if not paid."
David Graubart, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 399 N.E.2d at 932. That instruction was
not followed, but return was made within a reasonable time thereafter in accordance with
the banking practice. Id.
The U.N.P.C. adopts the Graubart approach and extends the midnight deadline for
seven days. See note 11 supra. Does this mean that there will be no more Idaho Forest
Industries decisions if the U.N.P.C. is adopted? One may argue that the drafters adopted
the seven day extension as a strict limit, a statement of public policy that cannot be changed
even by agreement. Such an argument, made with regard to the time limit of § 4-302, was
specifically rejected in Western Air Refrigeration, Inc. v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 599 F.2d
at 83, 90 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, U.N.P.C. § 3, like § 4-103(1) of the U.C.C.,
allows the effect of the provisions of the U.N.P.C. to be varied by agreement. Thus,
presumably under the U.N.P.C., just as with the U.C.C., the payee can agree to an exten-
sion or waiver of the midnight deadline of U.N.P.C. § 420(1)(c). Hence, unfortunately the
U.N.P.C. probably does 'not foreclose decisions like Idaho Forest Industries. Interesting-
ly, language precluding enforcement of such an agreement made by a consumer payee was
specifically excluded from the present draft. See U.N.P.C. § 3(1)(a).
112 521 P.2d 679, aff'd per curiam, 525 P.2d 19 (Mont. 1974).
113 521 P.2d at 687-88.
114Id. at 688.
111Id. at 687.
16 See id. at 689.
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in maintaining sufficient funds in the drawer's account to cover
the drawer's obligations owed to Miners. In so doing, Miners did
not pay the re-presented checks even when there were sufficient
funds to cover them, nor did they return three of the checks." 7
In Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co.,"I the Kentucky
Court of Appeals provided significant statutory interpretation and
a consideration of the policy implications in concluding that a re-
presented item must be treated the same as any other demand item.
The court rejected Leaderbrand's reliance on section 3-511(4)
because that section only applies to nonacceptance.'19 In addition,
the court properly noted that section 3-511(4) only excuses notice
of dishonor whereas section 4-301, upon which section 4-302 liabil-
ity is based, requires that the item be returned if available.' 2 The
court declared:
In the present case, both checks [including the re-presented one]
were available to the bank for return. Neither check was being
held for protest. Consequently, the only way the [payor] bank
could revoke its provisional settlement for the check was by
returning the check before its midnight deadline. As notice of
dishonor was not available as a means of revoking the provisional
settlement, the provisions of § 3-511(4) excusing notice of
dishonor could have no application to the case.' 2'
In addition, the court stated a practical reason for applying the
midnight deadline rule:
A significant number of previously dishonored checks are paid
upon re-presentment in the regular course of the check collec-
tion process. Such checks are often presented through in-
termediate collecting banks, such as the Federal Reserve Bank
in this case. Each collecting bank will have made a provisional
settlement with its transferor, and, in turn, received a provisional
,,' Id. at 682-83. The case involved four re-presented checks. One was returned more
than two months after the midnight deadline. The others were never returned. Id. at 682.
Professors Leary and Schmitt have suggested that Miners' liability was more properly
grounded in conversion rather than § 4-302 accountability. See Leary & Schmitt, note 11
supra, at 631-32.
555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
"' Id. at 598.
120 Id. at 599-600.
M22 Id. at 600.
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settlement from the bank to which it forwarded the check. In this
way a series of provisional credits are made ...
*. . If a payor bank was not required to meet its midnight
deadline with respect to previously dishonored items, then none
of the other banks involved in the collection process could safely
assume that the check had been paid. Consider the problems of
the depositary bank. It must permit its customer to withdraw the
amount of the credit given for the check when provisional set-
tlements have become final by payment and the bank has had
"a reasonable time" to learn that the settlement is final. See
UCC § 4-213(4)(a). The depositary bank will rarely receive notice
that an item has been paid. . . .If a payor bank is not bound
by its midnight deadline as to previously dishonored items, then
there is no way for the depositary bank to know whether a
previously dishonored item has been paid upon re-presentment
except by direct communication with the payor bank. Such a pro-
cedure would impose an unnecessary burden upon the check col-
lection process. 122
Arguably, Blake only makes checks which are re-presented
through the bank collection process subject to the midnight deadline
and does not affect checks which are re-presented directly to the
payor bank "for collection" where no provisional credits are
given. ' 23 Three cases which apply the midnight deadline to the re-
presented item cite Blake, and none of them considers whether
Blake should be so construed. Nor do these cases discuss whether
the method of re-presentment is important. The crux of at least
two cases is that section 4-302 states a rule beneficial to the system
and easy for payor banks to follow and that they should do so.
In Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Bank of Mid-Jersey, the court noted
the Blake court's position that different treatment of re-presented
items would unnecessarily burden the check collection process and
stated: "The plain fact is that in the modern world of check col-
lection a clear cut, mechanical rule of check acceptance is necessary,
and the common eventuality of previously dishonored checks be-
' 1 Id. at 600-01 (citing Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 331 (1965)).
'" See note 94 supra.
499 F. Supp. 1022 (D.N.J. 1980).
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ing represented cannot be permitted to upset a system relied upon
by banks across the nation."' 25
Interestingly, in this case Bank Leumi was the depositary bank
arguing for strict application of section 4-302. In Graubart, 126 Bank
Leumi was the payor bank which successfully argued that section
4-302 should not be applied to the re-presented item because of
the custom and practice in the New York area to hold such items
beyond the deadline. It seems likely that New Jersey banks, being
so proximate to New York, have the same custom. Here, Bank
Leumi obviously was not interested in proving such a fact! 27
In Prestige Motors, Inc. v. Carteret Bank & Trust Co.,128 the
payee personally re-presented the check which had been dishonored
when first presented through the collection process.' 29 The payee
left the check with the payor bank and took a receipt. 3 The court
cited Blake approvingly and said:
We recognize that it may be in the holder's interest to have
a drawee bank hold an item until sufficient funds arrive in the
drawer's account to permit payment of the item .... But it is
relatively simple for the drawee bank to comply with the mid-
night deadline rule unless contrary instructions have been re-
2 Id. at 1026. The court found that the payor's failure to act within the midnight
deadline amounted to acceptance. In so concluding, the court cited § 3-410, which defines
acceptance and speaks specifically of a bank's signature on a draft. The court recognized
that the bank's signature did not appear on the check, but noted that the provisions of
§ 3410 "must be read in harmony with Article 4, which provides detailed regulation of
the handling of checks .... Article 4 makes it clear that a check is accepted when it is
held past its midnight deadline." Id. By then citing § 4-302, the court seemingly held that
acceptance occurred under that section. But § 4-302 does not provide when acceptance oc-
curs. It is a strict liability section that makes the payor liable when it falls to act in a timely
fashion. See note 7 supra for the text of 4-302. See also § 4-213(I)(d) (payor accountable
when it has made a provisional settlement and failed to revoke same in timely fashion).
226 See text accompanying notes 81-91 supra for a discussion and analysis of Graubart.
27 This illustrates the point made in the Graubart discussion that banks will make
their arguments and take actions depending upon their status in the bank collection proc-
ess, and thus the agency relationship with their customers should not be the basis for bind-
ing the customer who has made no informed agreement. See text following note 88 supra.
-2 444 A.2d 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982), aff'd, 458 A.2d 140 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1983).
M 444 A.2d at 628.
130 Id.
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ceived. The drawee bank can easily protect itself against liabili-
ty by satisfying the midnight deadline rule. 131
The court found no evidence to indicate that the payee authorized
the bank to keep the check beyond the midnight deadline.'32
The third case citing Blake is Huntmix, Inc. v. Bank of
America.3 3 In Huntmix, the court noted the split of authority,
discussed the respective rationales, and concluded that the best ap-
proach is to apply section 4-302(a) to the re-presented check and
not extend the midnight deadline. '3  To support its position, the
court adopted the reasoning of Blake"' and in addition cited sec-
tion 4-108(1)136 which allows a collecting bank, "in a good faith
effort to secure payment," to extend the time limits imposed by
the U.C.C. for one additional banking day. 137 It gives no such op-
tion to the payor bank."'3 The court recognized the allure of allow-
ing payor banks to hold re-presented items for a longer time, but
refused to sanction such action.
A classic example of a situation calling for "a good faith ef-
fort to secure payment" by extending the time limits imposed by
[section 4-302] is a re-presentment of an insufficient funds check.
Typically, such re-presentment reflects a hope if not an expec-
tation that the drawer will deposit sufficient funds to cover the
check. By providing that only a collecting bank can "modify or
extend time limits imposed or permitted by this Code" [section
4-108] in such situations, [section 4-108] clearly recognizes that
such time limits otherwise are in effect. 139
It is surprising that Huntmix was the first case to cite section
4-108(1) when considering the application of the midnight deadline
"1 458 A.2d at 142.
132 Id.
"1 184 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1982).
"4 Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 559.
336 Id. at 558.
11 See note 10 supra for the full text of U.C.C. § 4-108(1).
M3 The court in Huntmix noted that the authority bestowed by U.C.C. § 4-108(1) upon
collecting banks "is withheld from payor banks by virtue of section 4-105(d) which defines
collecting bank as 'any bank handling the item for collection except the payor bank.'"
184 Cal. Rptr. at 558 (emphasis by the court).
"11 184 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
[Vol. 72
RE-PRESENTED CHECKS
to re-presented checks. The drafters could have written the section
to include payor banks. Failure to do so indicates the drafters' in-
tent that the payor bank, a special animal in the bank collection
process because only the payor has the drawer's funds and the
power to pay, should not be given latitude to extend time limits
without an informed agreement by the owner of the check.'4 1
CONCLUSION
So long as the Uniform Commercial Code in its present form
governs the issue, collecting and payor banks take significant risks
when they treat re-presented checks differently from checks col-
lected for the first time. Whether the economic and customer rela-
tions benefits outweigh these risks is a decision that the individual
bank must make.
One wonders just what are the customer relations benefits.
While many of us may re-deposit dishonored checks returned to
us,' 4' it does not follow that we want and expect our bank to make
that decision for us, especially if our bank does not notify us of
the dishonor. More importantly, it does not follow that when we
re-deposit a previously dishonored check we want or expect the
payor bank to hold it longer or treat it differently than any other
check we deposit.
The average bank customer knows little about the bank col-
lection process and probably never has heard of the midnight
deadline rule. What the average customer probably knows is that
his bank allows him to draw against a deposited check after the
expiration of a relatively short period of time. The customer ex-
pects that if nothing is heard from the bank during this period
everything is all right and the check was honored, and he expects
to hear from his bank if something goes wrong and the check is
not honored. These expectations probably do not change just
,,0 U.N.P.C. § 401(1) is consistent with its U.C.C. counterpart, § 4-108(1), in that
it allows only transmitting account institutions, not payor account institutions, to extend
time limits for an additional business day. See U.N.P.C. § 401(1). The U.N.P.C. "transmit-
ting account institution" is synonymous with a "collecting bank" as defined in the U.C.C.
Compare U.N.P.C. § 53(2) with U.C.C. § 4-105(d). Similarly, a U.N.P.C. "payor account
institution" is equivalent to a U.C.C. "payor bank." Compare U.N.P.C. § 53(4) with
U.C.C. § 4-105(b).
"' See note 3 supra.
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because a once dishonored check is re-deposited. Such expectations
should not be lost on courts when considering the re-presented
check, nor should they be overlooked by the banking community
when formulating its approach to this issue.
